# AFF

### 2AC - Realism Good

#### Rational realism is the best way to understand state behavior---anarchy drives states to compete. Peace is only possible if states account for material factors and information asymmetries---that makes our theory different than historical realist theories that deny a role for cooperation.

Glaser 18 (Charles, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington. “A Realist Perspective on the Constructivist Project” in Mariano E. Bertucci, Jarrod Hayes, and Patrick James eds. *Constructivism Reconsidered*. University Michigan Press. 181-196.

Realism: Partial, Yet Powerful

In light of the partial nature of the rational realist theory, one might wonder whether the rational theory is fully useful on its own and why realist theories continue to have so much influence within IR. In fact, the rational realist theory exists ~~stands~~ well on its own for a variety of reasons.

First, and most important in this context, the inputs to the rational theory are often known sufficiently well that effective analysis is possible without a more complete theory. Values of the independent variables are often knowable, and known, without a theory that fully explains them. For example, we can measure a state’s power without a full theory of the state that explains its productive potential and its ability to extract resources for national purposes. At the very least, basic material traits can be used to estimate power, with a well-established literature on that subject in place. Similarly, we can often be confident of the causal logics a state will employ to evaluate the impact of available strategies without having theories that explain the origins of the ideas and why one set of arguments was adopted instead of others. In other words, a theory of the inputs to the rational theory is not required to for the rational theory to support productive analysis

Second, the rationalist theory is well matched to analyzing many of the key questions that the field of IR is most interested in. These include such questions as: What factors influence the probability of war and, closely related, when is war more or less likely? Are cooperative or competitive strategies best matched to achieving a state’s security, economic, and other goals? When and why do states form alliances, engage in arms races, make territorial concessions, and join international institutions? Are states able to communicate information about their motives and intentions, and under what conditions is this possible? My point here is not that rational realist theories are the only theories capable of shedding light on these questions, as this would clearly undervalue other approaches. But the extensive realist literature that has productively tackled these questions, and many other related questions, should leave little doubt about the analytic value of the theories. This should not be a surprise, because the rationalist approach captures much of what is central to understanding the issues that drive these questions. And, of course, this is not an accident. Quite the opposite; this is why many analysts have chosen this approach to explore these questions.

Third, and closely related to the preceding discussion, the importance of these questions to real-world debates and states’ most important security and foreign policy choices virtually guarantees that realist analyses will continue to have a prominent role within IR. More specifically, theories of foreign and security policy that are built on rational realist foundations focus on the strategies that states can choose from—including investing in economic growth, allying, arming, bargaining, fighting, etc.—and therefore have great potential to contribute to policy debates.

Competition

Origins of the Competition

Given the extensive complementarity between the constructivist and realist theories, why have these approaches been cast as competitors in IR theory? Many factors have contributed. Part of the answer undoubtedly lies in the professional inclination within IR theory to generate new arguments that can replace those that preceded them. Some of the answer may lie in the dominance of realist theory during the Cold War and arguably since then, which has made it a target for all other types of explanations. Part of the answer may lie in an underappreciation of realism, especially structural realism, as a partial theory, which meant that complementarity was not possible.

In addition to these more generic reasons, some of the competition likely reflects the order in which certain key arguments have been established, which in turn left them vulnerable to critiques from alternative approaches. Specifically, Waltz’s seminal statement of structural realism made two arguments that were flawed or overstated, which left structural realism overly vulnerable: first, the theory was formulated and characterized as a purely material theory; and second, Waltz’s central conclusion was that the anarchic nature of the international system generated a strong tendency toward competition, rendering cooperation both rare and limited.14 As my sketch of structural realism explains, neither of these claims was sustainable, and strands of realism have been developed that correct these shortcomings.

Waltz’s formulation therefore left the door open for constructivists (as well as realists and others) to offer as competitors the ideational arguments and the cooperation-under-anarchy arguments that were missing. Wendt’s structural constructivism, which takes Waltz’s structural realism as its central point of departure, develops many of these opposing arguments from a constructivist perspective.15 If the rational realist theory had been more fully developed and appreciated before Wendt tackled these arguments, the debate might have proceeded rather differently. Instead of arguing that structural constructivism could explain and predict interaction and cooperation that were beyond the reach of Waltz’s realism, Wendt would have had to argue that his approach produced similar results from an alternative perspective. Instead, the approaches ended up at least partly talking past each other and appearing to clash even more than they actually do. There is, however, some real competition between the rational realist theory and Wendt’s structural constructivist theory.

Substance of the Competition

To appreciate how both competition and complementarity between realism and constructivism are possible, it is useful to distinguish different types of constructivism. Some constructivist work has focused on states and individuals, exploring the sources of beliefs, identifies, and norms. Other constructivist research has focused on the international system, exploring how structure influences states’ choices; Wendt’s is the defining work in the structural constructivist field.16 The complementary nature of constructivist arguments that focus on states and individuals is clear; as explained above, these theories explain inputs to the rational theory. In contrast, structural constructivism emphasizes the role of the international system on states’ actions and, therefore, runs largely parallel to structural realism, even though it defines the international system differently. This similarity and, closely related, the similarity in the questions the two approaches set out to answer makes them competitors.

Wendt argues that the key to understanding the possibility of multiple “logics” of anarchy is “conceptualizing structure in social rather than material terms.” The sole variable in Waltz’s international structure is the distribution of capabilities. Consequently, Waltz’s theory is characterized as purely material.17 Waltz concludes that international anarchy requires states to pursue competitive policies; in Wendt’s terminology, this means that Waltz finds that anarchy has a single logic. Wendt argues instead that anarchy can take three principal forms, which vary in their tendencies to generate competition and cooperation. He defines the different anarchies in terms of the states’ roles, specifically their orientation toward each other—enemy, rival, and friend—which reflect the rules that states expect others to observe. Working with these structural roles, Wendt explains how cooperation and even deep peace are possible within international anarchy. Enemies generate a Hobbesian anarchy that is highly competitive; although similar in some ways to the anarchy explained by Waltz’s neorealism, the Hobbesian anarchy is more competitive and states are more insecure. Rivals generate a Lockean anarchy that is less competitive and that, Wendt argues, is in certain respects closer to Waltz’s anarchy. Friends are concerned not only about their own security, but also other states’ security, and their interaction generates a Kantian anarchy in which states do not fear that others will use force against them and in which confidence in a long-lasting peace is possible.18

Wendt’s effort to explore the possibility that international anarchy can produce a much wider range of outcomes than is suggested by Waltz is a productive move. Whether extensive security cooperation is possible under anarchy is the central question posed by structural IR theories. Moreover, a variety of historical examples that run counter to Waltz’s claim about the persistent presence of competition—including restraint and cooperation between powerful states, and substantial military capabilities that do not generate substantial insecurity—indicate the need for a more encompassing theory. Wendt’s focus on social variables, however, masks the potential of structural realist and rational theories to explain variation in states’ policies under anarchy and thereby incorrectly suggests that realist theories are incapable of explaining broad and basic variation in states’ strategies in the face of anarchy. In fact, Wendt is explicit on this critical issue:

The real question is whether the fact of anarchy creates a tendency for all such interactions to realize a single logic at the macro-level. In the Neorealist view they do: anarchies are inherently self-help systems that tend to produce military competition, balances of power, and war. Against this I argue that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles—enemy, rival, and friend—dominate the system.19

To appreciate why structural realism can explain and predict cooperation but that this possibility is overlooked by Waltz, we need to return to his core argument. It turns out that the logic of Waltz’s arguments requires the introduction of another variable: a state’s information about the opposing state’s motives. Waltz holds that although states may have motives beyond security, their international behavior can be understood largely by assuming that they are seeking only security. If, however, all states knew that all the other states were security seekers (and if all states knew that this is what the others knew), then the international system should not generate competition. This uncertainty about the opposing state’s type lies at the core of the security dilemma, and, closely related, the security dilemma lies at the center of structural realism’s ability to explain competition.20 If states did not face a security dilemma, security seekers could always achieve their core objective while adopting policies that avoided generating competition. Once the importance of uncertainty about motives is made explicit, including it as a variable is the natural next step for the rational theory.

A key point for our discussion here is that structural realism, or at the least the more general rational theory that logically flows from it, is no longer a purely material theory. This matters because it means that distinguishing realist and constructivist theories in terms of material versus ideational arguments—a broad category that is typically understood to include information, norms, and causal ideas—no longer creates a sharp divide.

The implications reach beyond mere characterizations and definitions, however. Including information about motives as a key variable in a rational realist theory opens the door to arguments that address much of the terrain also covered by Wendt’s structural constructivism. More specifically, the rational realist theory (1) explores the nature of interactions that can enable states to revise their assessments of the opposing state’s type and thereby generate more cooperative or more competitive policies, providing a more straightforward explanation than Wendt’s changes in interests, (2) explains international cooperation under anarchy as a result of information in combination with material factors instead of Wendt’s focus on identities, and (3) shows that Wendt has both exaggerated and underestimated the potential for international cooperation, the former by underplaying the role of material factors in constraining states’ choices and the latter by relying on states’ collective interests instead of pure security seeking, which is more neutral regarding cooperation. The remainder of this section sketches these points.21

First, the realist theory provides an alternative explanation of how states’ interactions can influence their relationship and, in turn, their behavior. Wendt argues that interaction between states is the key to their understandings of self and other, and that interactions play a central role in determining whether the international system is competitive or cooperative. He holds that interaction cannot play this important role in realist theories, because “realists would probably argue that each should act on the basis of worst-case assumptions about the other’s intentions, justifying such an attitude as prudent in view of the possibility of death from making a mistake.”22 This is a reasonable reading of Waltz; since he barely touches on a possible role for information about the opposing side, assuming the worst can be seen as implicitly running through his formulation. Offensive realism makes fully explicit the requirement for states to assume the worst about opposing states.23 Contrary to this position, however, rational states should not assume the worst when facing uncertainty about their adversary’s motives and intentions. Instead, at least from a standard expected utility perspective, a state should consider the probability that the opposing state is a revisionist/greedy type as opposed to status quo/security type. The state should also consider the danger if the opposing state is a greedy type; many types of cooperation would not put the state at great risk, that is, death is not always, or even usually, the cost of misjudging the adversary’s motives. These arguments lie at the core of the rationalist realist theory that includes information as a key variable defining a state’s international environment, which in turn enables the theory to fully integrate the security dilemma into its arguments.

Given this realist formulation, states’ interactions can influence their understanding (their information) of the opposing state’s motives. When a state takes an action that would be more likely to be taken by a security-seeking state than by a greedy state, the opposing state should positively update its prior estimate of the probability that the state has security motives. Because states have an incentive to mislead adversaries, the opposing state should only find useful information when the state’s action is costly, that is, when the state’s action is a “costly signal.” This occurs when a specific cooperative action would be more costly for a greedy state than for a security-seeking state. Wendt describes a similar process of interaction but emphasizes different changes and relies on different types of arguments— symbolic interactionism—not rational updating made possible by costly signals. His arguments describe how states’ interactions can change their interests and identities, which in turn support cooperation in anarchy. The rationalist explanation has the advantage of greater simplicity—it holds interests constant, does not involve the creation of social structures, and does not require changes in interests—while appearing to explain essentially the same international phenomenon.

Second, the rational realist theory explains that anarchy can generate a variety of outcomes—including various degrees of competition, cooperation, and mixtures of the two—that have much in common with Wendt’s three anarchies. According to the rational theory, whether a securityseeking state should choose cooperation over competition depends on both material variables, which include the state’s power and offensedefense variables, and information variables, which capture what a state knows about its adversary’s motives.24 Material variables largely determine the military capabilities a state can acquire, given the opposing state’s ability to build military forces of its own. They determine the types of military missions that states will be able to perform and their relative prospects for performing them successfully.

Information variables influence a state’s expectations about its adversary’s behavior, including reactions to the state’s own policies. The theory explains that when defense has the advantage—that is, when holding territory or maintaining the capabilities required for deterrence are relatively easy—states can achieve high levels of security without engaging in intense competition. When offense and defense are distinguishable—that is, when the forces that support offensive missions would contribute less (or more) to defensive missions—states may be able to choose forces and strategies that signal benign motives and to use arms control to increase the feasibility of defensive force postures. Information variables also influence the prospects for cooperation. A state that believes the opposing state is likely to be a security seeker should be more willing to run the risks of restraint and cooperation. These strategies have the potential to generate positive political spirals, which can in turn make states willing to choose military strategies that pose smaller risks to others’ security.

In short, the rationalist theory describes the conditions under which anarchy can produce cooperative international security policies and relatively peaceful international politics. It both corrects Waltz’s conclusion about the general tendency for anarchy to generate competition and shows that Wendt’s social structure is unnecessary to produce this result. Again, the rationalist theory has the advantage of being more straightforward, less complex, and more parsimonious than Wendt’s constructivist alternative.

Third, and related, the rationalist theory shows that Wendt is both too pessimistic and too optimistic, in different ways, about the prospects for cooperation under anarchy. On the pessimistic side, the rationalist theory shows that cooperation is possible without introducing “friends,” that is, states that have collective identities in which they value each other’s security as well as their own. According to the rational realist argument, the states’ international situation is doing most of the work; nonfriends—security seekers that do not value others’ security—have fundamental preferences that are relatively neutral between cooperation and competition. In contrast, collective identities and altruistic preferences play a central role in the constructivist argument, and it views them as necessary for deep cooperation. My point here is not that considering the impact of collective identities is analytically flawed, but that relying on collective identities to make extensive cooperation possible is a significantly weaker finding regarding the potential of anarchy to allow and support cooperation. If, as seems likely, pure security seekers are much more common than friends, then Wendt is pessimistic about cooperation under anarchy, in that he finds the possibility of cooperation existing under narrower, less common conditions.

At the same time, however, Wendt is overly optimistic about the prospects for cooperation because he fails to adequately incorporate the constraints that information and material factors can impose on states’ policies. A strength of the rational realist theory is that it explicitly explains how both material variables and information variables influence the prospects for cooperation, and how they interact. In contrast, Wendt’s social theory does not bring in material factors and thereby implicitly ignores the constraints they could impose. Wendt is partially correct in arguing that “History matters. Security dilemmas are not acts of God; they are effects of practice.”25 States, however, do not get to choose their history at the time they are making forward-looking decisions. Of course, in the past they did have partial control over it via the policy choices they made, although these were constrained by information and material factors. At the time of a new choice, however, the past and its related history are fixed and thereby impose severe constraints on states’ practice/choices. Their interactions may start under information conditions that prevent them from overcoming material conditions that make cooperative policies too risky. Moreover, these information conditions could reflect previous material conditions that required the security-seeking state to compete, thereby signaling greedy motives, which contributed to the initial information from which the states begin this round of interaction. Consequently, although certainty or near certainty that the opposing state is a security seeker could be sufficient to eliminate the security dilemma under even very dangerous material conditions, states will not always have this information. Moreover, a state can face material conditions—for example, offense dominance—that make cooperation too risky, even when the state believes that adversary is probably a security-seeking state. In short, states can face constraints that require them to choose competitive policies, which can make the security dilemma still more severe and cooperation a still worse option.

### 1AR – Realism Good

#### Realism is politically useful even if its not theoretically perfect---their reductionism results in ahistoricity that triggers worse violence

Abraham 17 (Kavi Joseph, Johns Hopkins University. “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” https://academic.oup.com/ips/article-abstract/11/3/221/3798787)

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. A third response, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this failing does not delegitimize other realist insights. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better.

The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements.

Thinking from the Present

By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a counter-imperial machine, to cultivate a shared spirituality that can gather diverse and divergent constituencies to confront dangerous practices. In my estimation, countering an imperial machine that operates in complex ways and at complex sites requires a political strategy as unwieldy and diffuse, linking constituencies that we may otherwise dismiss. That a tradition of realism regularly circulates through halls of power across the globe should be reason not to reject righteously but rather to leverage its authorized status. We can talk about imperialism, knowledge production, and race here, while they can talk about anarchy, power, and self-interest there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that reverberate among us. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” this argument involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward new research agendas and new forms of critique that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention.

Needless to say, drawing together realist and postcolonial thought, as this essay has done, can be met with analytical skepticism and political hostility. A mode of argumentation that refuses comparisons of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists strikes a note of analytical evasion. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, the argument anticipates strong political reservations: why align the project of postcolonial theory with realism, an unethical tradition of militarism and realpolitik? To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, reducing “realists” to a coherent body of thought not only obscures the complexity of their thinking (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) but reproduces the narrative of transhistorical unity that some realists use to authorize unethical policy programs in the first place. More critically, however, in embodying an unproductive ahistoricism, it poses conventional realist categories of anarchy, selfinterest, and military power as the political problem to confront whereas the present historical context demands attunement to how some of these drives (militarism, national interest) connect with discrete problems of liberalism and imperial practices. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that countering imperial formations may benefit from resonances established not just among postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but contemporary realists who identify links between liberalism and imperialism (Walt 2013). Indeed, if realism as a policy program defending the national interest is entangled with current militaristic and imperial interventions, we should push the premise of this statement, that difference should be defended, in anti-imperial and prudential directions. Doing so may allow new openings to emerge in the present sense of closure, new strategies to think and defend alternative politics. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.

### 2AC – War First

#### Case turns the K – War is qualitatively different then everyday life - The affs pragmatic approach to security is compatible and necessary to accomplish feminism goals in IR

Peach 4 (Lucinda Joy, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at American University, 2004, “A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Hashmi, p. 436-441)

The pragmatist feminist perspective that I develop in this chapter is deeply indebted to and affirms in many respects the antiwar feminist approach outlined by Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick in the preceding chapter, but with some marked differences. These differences, I argue, reveal more completely both the promise and the limitations of antiwar feminism.

At the outset, it is important to note that there is neither a single "feminism" nor a single "pragmatism" with which it might be aligned. Instead, there are multiple feminisms, just as there are multiple pragmatisms. The "pragmatist feminism" developed in this essay draws on several elements from American Pragmatism, a philosophical school developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most prominently by Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead.

Despite the many differences among the pragmatists, they tend to share several features. Perhaps most salient to the subject of this volume is their presumption "that human agency in all of its higher manifestations has evolved from ... concrete circumstances in which a vulnerable organism is confronted, often (if not usually) in concert with other organisms of the same species, with possibilities of both injury and fulfillment."' It is the continuous reminder of "human fallibility and finitude"' that constrains pragmatists from positions such as foundationalism and dogmatism and thus against ideologies that encourage the use of armed force, and especially of WMD, in all but the most extreme circumstances. It is also a reminder that armed conflicts are composed of embodied human beings, each of whom has the capacity for suffering as well as happiness, a point stressed by feminist analyses of armed conflicts.

There are several significant points of commonality or intersection between pragmatism and feminism.3 Perhaps most important for thinking about the ethics of weapons of mass destruction is that both are actively engaged in attempting to solve social problems. The early pragmatists viewed the purpose of philosophical reflection to be "the intelligent overcoming of oppressive conditions." Dewey, for example, recommended the criticism of beliefs underlying society that have led to "unsatisfactory conditions in order to radically reconstruct our society according to non-oppressive and cooperative standards."5

Feminist goals of liberating women from oppression thus echo pragmatist ones. While most often feminist movements have been focused specifically on ending the male domination and oppression of women, a more inclusive feminist vision has as its object the elimination of all hierarchical and oppressive relationships, including the oppression of so-called third world or developing nations (especially of the Global South) by those of the so-called first world or industrialized nations (especially of the Global North), of ethnic, cultural, racial, or religious minorities by majorities, homosexuals by heterosexuals, the poor by the wealthy, children by adults, and so on.

In addition, pragmatists advocate the elimination of sharp divisions between theory and practice, reason and experience, and knowing and doing.8 Pragmatists focus much more on consequences rather than on a priori abstract conceptualizing, captured in the phrase that pragmatists assign value on the basis of "what works" or what provides "emotional satisfaction."9 From a pragmatist perspective, the most important questions are practical ones.

Pragmatists consider moral agents to be actors within a concrete particular context that both influences what is experienced and is influenced by those experiences. The inextricability of the perceiver from what is perceived means that action, whether in the context of armed conflict and the use of WMD or otherwise, must be situated within the larger context of which it is a part. Since every decision to enter or engage in an armed conflict and every decision to deploy WMD, of whatever type, must be considered within the full context of other relevant actors, agencies, and term strategies or results,12 a pragmatist perspective is unlikely to result in the kind of abstract thinking that antiwar feminism criticizes in dominant just war and realist approaches.13

Feminism also shares pragmatism's rejection of traditional rationalist and empiricist approaches and its commitment to the inseparability of theory and practice.14 Both believe that reason must be grounded in experience and requires being supplemented, at least in particular circumstances, by emotion.15 In this respect, feminists also favor a posteriori rather than a priori forms of knowledge, those that develop on the basis of experience rather than those that are posited prior to it.16

In sum, both pragmatism and feminism accord a central place to the particular, the concrete, and the factual elements of experience, as opposed to the universal, the generalizable, and the abstract.17 This opposition to abstraction is apparent, for example, in feminist understandings of women's "different voice" and Dewey's views about the importance of the qualitative background of situations. In contrast to mainstream philosophy, both feminist and pragmatist perspectives focus on everyday life and emphasize respect for others and the constitutiveness of community. The pragmatists' sensitivity to the social embeddedness of persons led them to understand the "I" "only in relation to other selves, so that the autonomy of individual agents needed to be integrated with their status as social beings" existing in community. 18

This common conception of the "relational self" suggests that both pragmatists and feminists will resist turning others into "the Other," who can then be demonized and made into "the enemy," suitable to be killed. The feminist commitment to the well-being of others, in both the local and the global community, is well illustrated by Carol Cohn's and Sara Ruddick's contribution to this volume. However, this commitment also provides the basis for the pragmatist feminist position articulated here that refuses to categorically rule out the moral legitimacy of any resort to armed force or war, since such resort may be morally imperative to protect innocent others.

In addition to these marked similarities, it is also important to acknowledge how a pragmatist feminism differs significantly from American Pragmatism. Perhaps most important is pragmatist feminism's attention to the gendered character of the social world and gender's impact on the formation and maintenance of male and female identities. These subjects largely were ignored by the American Pragmatists19 but influence the analysis of the ethics of WMD outlined here. In addition, feminists tend to give greater import to the cognitive aspects of affect than pragmatists, even though, as already discussed, pragmatists recognize the importance of emotions to agency and cognition.

Despite its differences from more mainstream strands of feminism, pragmatist feminism shares the goals of many strands of feminism to make gender a central consideration of the analysis (here of armed force and WMD)20 and to eradicate (patriarchal) oppression and domination. These goals result in a strong presumption against the use of any weapons, not only WMD, since they are in their very inception designed as tools for domination and suppression of others designated as "the enemy." This opposition to the use of armed force is related to feminist observations of the patriarchal and hierarchical, male-dominated and -controlled character of the military and the oppressive effects of war and militarism around the world, especially on women and children. In addition, the pragmatist feminist view described here affirms much in the "constitutive positions" of antiwar feminism articulated by Cohn and Ruddick,21 especially its observation of the gendered character of war and militarism, its suspicion of masculinist approaches to war and conflict resolution, and its critique of the dominant tradition for its focus on the physical, military, and strategic effects of these weapons separate from their embeddedness in the rest of social and political life.

With this brief overview in mind, in the following section, I describe how a pragmatist feminist perspective compares with the antiwar feminist position outlined by Cohn and Ruddick in Chapter 21 with respect to the specific issues addressed by this volume.

SOURCES AND PRINCIPLES

Although pragmatist feminism itself does not directly provide general norms governing the use of weapons in war, it does so indirectly through its affirmation of elements of justwar theory, as described below. Pragmatist feminism does not categorically rule out the use of armed force or engagement in war. Its pragmatist perspective steers in a different direction from the antiwar feminists' "practical" opposition to war. Whereas the realist tradition has been unduly pessimistic in its assumption that war and armed conflict are necessary, certain, and inevitable, on a pragmatist feminist view, antiwar feminist thinking tends to be unduly optimistic about the human capacity to transcend the use of violent methods of resolving disputes, given the consistent and continual resort to such means throughout most of human history.

From a pragmatist feminist perspective, the historical and contemporary experience of the repeated resort to violence and the inability of humanity thus far to develop alternative mechanisms for resolving large-scale disputes suggests the likelihood of future wars and armed conflicts. In light of this history, overcoming the "war culture" that antiwar feminists view so unfavorably can be possible only outside the immediate situation of armed conflict.

Once the aggressor has struck or threatens to do so imminently, it is too late to change our societies and ourselves in order to avoid war. Rather, it is then necessary to act in order to avoid annihilation in one form or another.

Given its view that some wars and some opposition to war and armed conflicts are morally necessary to protect ourselves and others from harm, pragmatist feminists seek to impose moral limits on the harm and suffering to the minimum necessary. Despite an awareness of its limitations,22 a pragmatist feminist perspective considers just war theory to provide a flexible and modifiable set of criteria for attempting to act morally and in accordance with principles of justice, both in entering into an armed conflict (jus ad bellum) and in the actual engagement of that conflict (jus in bello). In particular, pragmatist feminism shares just war's starting premise of a strong presumption against the legitimacy of the use of armed force and violence to resolve conflicts.

A pragmatist feminist perspective thus rejects Cohn's and Ruddick's contention that justwar theorists "implicitly accept war as a practice even when condemning particular wars."23 Recognizing the historical and global reality of war making and armed force as means of resolving conflicts and adopting strategies to maximize justice and minimize immorality when such means are adopted is not the same as "implicitly accepting the practices of war," at least in the absence of demonstrably effective means of eliminating such conflicts. To ignore the reality of the continuing resort to war and armed force is itself to revert to abstraction rather than offering a practical method for eliminating the human suffering and incalculable damage caused by war and armed conflict.

Here Colin and Ruddick reveal (intentionally or otherwise) their situatedness as citizens of a war-making state, one that has had the choice in many, if not all, instances since the mid-twentieth century, at least, of deciding whether or not to go to war. Just as Cohn and Ruddick criticize just war theory for failing to explore nonviolent alternatives once a just cause is determined or war has begun, their antiwar feminist approach fails to offer concrete suggestions for avoiding armed conflict when a nation or people is confronted with armed aggression or assault by others, the situation where the options boil down to "fight or die." This perspective fails to look at war from the point of view of the aggressed-against, when armed conflict becomes a necessity in order to retain national and/or cultural and/or ethnic identity from subjugation by the aggressor(s). In such circumstances, the moral necessity of armed force looks quite different. And in such circumstances, the threatened use of WMD can be seen as less evil than the alternatives, such as doing nothing and being conquered or fighting a conventional war and faring poorly.

Rather than reverting to abstract thinking about war, pragmatist feminism affirms just war theory's casuistic approach to particular armed conflicts as well as its position that such means are sometimes morally justifiable or even morally obligator)' in order to protect oneself (individual or nation) or innocent third parties. Further, pragmatist feminism affirms just war thinking's attention to particular conflicts rather than war in the abstract and its stance of moderation and of imposing the minimal suffering necessary to accomplish the objective of restoring the peace.24 Thus, with respect to the military response of the United States to the September 11 terrorist attacks, a pragmatist feminist application of just war criteria yields the conclusion that the jus ad bellum principles of "last resort" and "proportionality," as well as the in hello principles of "proportionality" and "discrimination," were not satisfied.

A second difference in the two feminist perspectives emerges out of the antiwar feminist observation that war and militarism are not separate from everyday life but integral aspects of it.25 While this is an extremely important insight into the underlying conditions of war and militarism, it needs to be joined with alternative proposals for addressing the "large-scale military conflict." There has been scant attention to this issue in antiwar feminist scholarship. Even if one assumes, as antiwar feminists do, that war is a "presence" in everyday life and not merely a discrete "event" that occasionally "erupts,"26 it is nonetheless the case that "war" is more damaging and harmful, and creates greater suffering in a multiplicity of ways, than the absence of war. Pragmatist feminist thinking about the ethics of WMD is attentive to how such differences in consequences differentiate war from “everyday life.”

A third significant area of difference between the two types of feminist theories concerns responses to the causes of war. Whereas pragmatist feminists agree with antiwar feminists that wars are partially a mutual construction, they also insist that some wars have much more to do with unjust aggression for which opposing sides do not share equal responsibility. Antiwar feminism fails to accept that some wars are not only necessary as a matter of prudence, but also morally justifiable *on feminist grounds*, for example, humanitarian intervention to end the severe oppression of innocent victims.

### 2AC – Extinction O/W

#### Preventing extinction isn’t liberal futurity or naïve optimism---mobilizing against dangerous conditions is preferable to fatalism that consigns the planet to nuclear war.

Stevens 18 (Tim, Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former.

As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68

Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.74

Productive pessimism and temporality

In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote:

For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75

Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.77

This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.80

Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.84

Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance:

The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85

Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88

Herz was explicit about this: a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary.89 Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded. In this sense, pessimism can be productive. It produces positive outcomes through action, rather than negative ones through inaction or resignation. These are subjective value-judgements, to be sure, but are obtained through a process of realist engagement with the world, rather than blind [mere] fumbling or ideological railroading. Survival Research was a response to Herz’s pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it. This leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international relations.

The first is that pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world. If anything, the example of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of pessimism was no ‘passive fatalism’.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult ones’.91 Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for conservatism in theory or practice.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, despite his pessimism about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant political issues.93 This required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it; not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents ‘pessimism from turning into fatalism’.95

The second observation is that it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as oppositional.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In Herz, they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication. Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never more than guarded’, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political mind.99 Even as his pessimism deepened over the course of his career, he was always wont to end his analyses with a ‘yet’ or ‘in spite of it all’.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on, although, as he admitted in a footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project for another twenty years. This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction, nor even a subtle version of hope, but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, engendered as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change.

### 2AC - Perm

#### Perm: Do both - Working with both critical feminist IR and traditional IR is most productive and consistent with the neg’s literature

**Hudson et al 10** (Valerie M., Prof. of Poli Sci @ Texas A&M, PhD in Poli Sci from Ohio State R. Charli Carpenter, Associate Prof. of Poli Sci @ the University of Massachussetts-Amherst, PhD in Poli Sci from the University of Oregon; Mary Caprioli, Associate Prof. of Poli Sci and Director of the International Studies program @ the University of Minnesota-Duluth, PhD from the University of Connecticut; “Gender and Global Security,” in *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark, 2010)

We acknowledge the important role played by some IR feminists in critiquing/expanding security studies to be more inclusive of women's needs. But it is also true that deploying gender as a variable and a category of analysis has contributed important insights to security studies, which must be taken seriously by security studies scholars not only for feminist reasons, but because security scholars – and policy makers – miss much of what is going on by ignoring gender. **We reject the claim that IR feminist approaches require non-quantitative methods or a critical theoretical epistemology, a claim which has in the past been reified both by IR feminists** (Tickner 2005) and by those writing within the IR mainstream (e.g., Carpenter 2003). **As Mary Caprioli has argued, much quantitative work is also relevant to feminist questions** (Caprioli 2004). We agree with Robert Keohane (1989) that gender as a category of analysis can contribute something to IR as conventionally defined, and it is this contribution which we explore in this essay.¶ In our view, **seeking to integrate gender more fully into the discipline of security studies serves to validate the empirical insights yielded by many feminist IR scholars by taking them seriously within the mainstream**. While methodologies and specification of explanans and explanandum may differ from the work cited above, **such analysis can indeed be consistent with “rethinking security on feminist grounds.” By drawing on empirical insights from gender theory, while speaking to the major concerns of international security studies** as a discipline, the **literature on gender and security can speak to both IR feminists and security studies scholars**. In this essay, we will concentrate on what this literature can say to mainstream security studies, whose primary concerns are, following Walt: “the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991:212).¶ **Taking a gender perspective need not entail a rejection of conventional concepts, methodologies, or questions that define the discipline.** Unlike the critical feminist scholarship, which is skeptical of conventional methodologies, this literature review includes a range of **empirical scholarship on gender,** whether qualitative or quantitative, positivist or constructivist, that **make a meaningful contribution to security studies**.

### 1AR - Perm

#### The aff and alts methods should be synthesized – rejecting the permutation creates a methodological hierarchy that limits both theories

Sjoberg et al. 16 (Laura Sjoberg, Kelly Kadera, and Cameron G. Thies, Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University, 9-23-2016, accessed on 11-4-2020, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 62, Issue 4, "Reevaluating Gender and IR Scholarship: Moving beyond Reiter’s Dichotomies toward Effective Synergies", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002716669207)

These two broad research traditions talk about similar subjects but in different ways. Postpositivists problematize, while maintaining an interest in, questions of where and how women participate in political violence. Likewise, the best positivist analyses of where and how women participate in political violence are theoretically informed by complex understandings of gender and gender relations. Yet, these two groups of scholars’ adherence to their own intellectual traditions limit their ability to produce synergistic understandings of gender and violence. Because many feminist researchers reject positivists’ tendency to use dichotomized understandings that reduce gender to sex in order to formulate testable hypotheses, they find it difficult to directly engage those hypotheses and the associated statistical results. Yet feminist scholars are well situated, for example, to provide deeper sociological interpretations of the findings of positivist data analysis and to use the results of that data analysis to tell more complicated stories. Positivists’ tools, on the other hand, are poorly suited to addressing the questions with which feminist research is most concerned. First, positivists’ implicit assumptions that sex categories are stable, dichotomous, and contain essential characteristics that can be read onto people hamper their ability to account for gender differences as constitutive of sex differences in political violence. In other words, it impedes their ability to recognize statistical problems with which they are otherwise quite familiar: correlations (between sex and violence) may be spurious (with gender as the underlying cause) and correlations can be produced by unseen or difficult to measure intervening variables (Kadera and Mitchell 2005). Second, standard regression analyses are constrained by the difficulty of detecting coconstitution and the challenges of directly testing relationships between quantifiable and unquantifiable phenomena.4 Neither research program is above reproach on its own terms either. Large-n statistical work on women’s political violence encounters difficulties other large-n statistical work does not: it is, for example, limited by difficulties in obtaining data, including criminalization of most political violence, the fact that politically violent women commit (and often hide) transgressions of gender norms, secrecy of politically violent groups, personal security risks in conflict zones, and political interests of both researchers and their funders. Feminist work, even as it seeks to resist sensationalization and stereotyping, can struggle with sex, race, and cultural essentialism as it tries to make sense of performance, presentation, and policy surrounding women’s violence in global politics.5 The two research approaches cannot—and do not aim to—analyze identical subjects. Furthermore, neither can provide sufficient leverage on all forms of relevant questions related to women’s political violence to warrant excluding or superseding the other. A deeper, more engaged dialogue that accepts these differences (and sometimes incommensurabilities) would provide significant intellectual purchase. In order to build effective positivist–feminist bridges, we must recognize what each piece of research analyzes and evaluates, and its analytical strengths and weaknesses. Dialogues can then address and engage the knowledge parameters that limit the generalization of particular claims, resulting in richer conversations about both extant work and trajectories for future research. Seeing Effective Synergies The syntheses we envision, then, do not equate or compare apples and oranges or create a hierarchy among approaches. Instead, they leverage difference as a source of complementarity and differences as a source of dialogue. Recognizing the rich nuances of a variety of work in gender and IR, rather than dichotomizing understandings, produces more effective engagement. Below, we provide three examples from the literatures on conflict sexual violence, international norms and Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and terrorism and political violence, of actual and potential dialogues.

### 2AC - Link Turn (Arms Control)

#### War turns gendered violence, but analysis isn’t enough – only material engagement with the circulation and use of weapons makes feminist advocacy effective

Mhajne 18 (Anwar, a Palestnian citzen of Israel, recently received her Ph.D. in Politcal Science from the University of Cincinnat in the US. Her current research focuses on gender, politcs, and religion. "THE FUTURE OF FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY: TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF WOMEN’S (AND MEN’S) SECURITY." <https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Disrupted%20-%20The%20Post-Colonial%20Issue-Anwar%20Mhajne.pdf>)

As opposed to the aforementioned foreign policies, an effective feminist foreign policy needs to acknowledge existing power structures and analyse the causes and consequences of patriarchy, militarisation, and neoliberalism as the dominant order. Profiting from arms production creates a vested interest in sustaining the systems of war. The manufacture, trade, proliferation, possession, and use of weapons facilitate sexual and gender-based violence, human trafficking, and armed conflicts, which are integrally tied up with violent masculinities. Governments need to reallocate resources spent on the military towards activities that benefit women and humanity in general, such as implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. As Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) have always argued, bloated military spending raids funds set aside for human security and sustainable development: “If the [1.6 trillion USD] spent on military security in 2015 was directed towards human security, this would provide a substantial portion of the total needed to realise the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals” (WILPF, 2017: 20). Militarism and arms trades are tightly connected. An emphasis on militarism might serve the interests of those profiting from arms production, thus sustaining the systems of war. As various studies produced by WILPF and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) demonstrate (see: Gaynor, 2015 & WILPF, 2016), women and girls often disproportionately suffer from the use of weapons in conflict due to “forced displacement, sexual violence, trafficking, lack of access to health care (including sexual and reproductive health), and lack of access to victim and survivor assistance” (WILPF, 2016: 6).

Therefore, a more impactful approach to feminist foreign policy should be based on challenging militarism and preventing arms from reaching entities that will utilise them to violate the rights of men and women. A feminist foreign policy should not only focus on addressing women’s needs during conflict, but also focus on preventing conflict itself and reducing its intensity through controlling the influx of weapons and limiting arms trade. It is important to ensure that peace processes are inclusive and gender-sensitive, but this alone is insufficient. Rather, to ensure peace, policymakers need to focus on how militarism and arms trade fuel conflicts and increase civilian casualties for men and women alike. A feminist foreign policy should enable effective conflict prevention through disarmament, women’s meaningful participation, and providing effective conditions for women’s empowerment.

### 2AC - Case Outweighs

#### Our impact outweighs and the alt fails— forwarding claims about representations over resolving the violence of war-torn areas is simply academic complicity.

Hudson 15 (Heidi, professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, “(Re)framing the Relationship between Discourse and Materiality in Feminist Security Studies and Feminist IPE,” pg 413-419, Politics & Gender; Cambridge Vol. 11, Iss. 2, June 2015)

Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics¶ While feminists usually try to ground the meanings that they study, theorizing the mundane or the everyday may very well represent a detour--or even a dead end--if bread-and-butter issues related to the security and economic well-being of ordinary women and men [people] are ignored. What value does feminist theorizing (even if it draws from women's lived experiences) have in war-affected contexts where meeting immediate needs is paramount? At what point does the theorizing of the body under such circumstances become a means to satisfying intellectual fetishes? Theorizing the everyday is messy because it has to contend with the immediate social setting in which popular culture is inseparable from the economic materiality of the conditions of oppression.¶ In response to this dilemma, my aim is to argue for a productive rather than a reductive relationship between Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist (International) Political Economy (FPE), achieved through a reframed relationship between discursive subjectivity and a structure-centred materiality. I argue for a more systematic feminist analysis that reunites FPE and cultural FSS critiques. This analytical synthesis is based on an understanding of the co-constituted agency of discourse and materiality underpinned by a postcolonial-feminist attention to the politics of space.¶ After the Cold War, security became a catch-all concept for critical variants of IR, but instead of working against disciplinary fragmentation, "security has settled into each new camp in particularistic ways" (Sylvester 2013, 618). For FSS the main concern is to underscore the conceptual necessity of gender to understanding security. Although scholars have also emphasized the theoretical and methodological diversity of FSS, I contend that there is an implicit hierarchy of sorts when it comes to which critical tradition matters more theoretically or epistemologically--with a subtle but distinct privileging of the discursive as evidenced by the influential contributions of, among others, Judith Butler (1993), Karin Fierke (2013a), Lene Hansen (2006), and Laura Shepherd (2008). FSS thus tends to focus on the gendered, discursive construction of forms of violence with less attention paid to materialities of economic insecurity. In contrast, FPE tends to avoid the security frame and its discursive implications and concentrates more on gender as a social relation of inequality and the gendered effects of capitalism or economic globalization.¶ Poststructuralist scholarship in FSS insists that the discursive is not privileged over the material and that objects in the material world and human subjects both take their forms and agencies relationally, as they are embedded within particular locations. Similarly, gendered and embodied security is theorized to be the outcome of relational processes--performed in, by, and through those relations. Theory thus makes practice (Foucault 1972). Yet, thinking about our bodies as cultural constructs, produced as objects in security discourse, has a high level of abstraction. Before we can analyze discourse about bodies, shouldn't we first make the bodies from "other worlds," rooted in everyday struggles of human insecurity, feature in IR? How is attention to contextualized discourses of individuals or groups without considering their basic needs different from what liberal feminists are doing, namely treating those whose security is at stake as abstract, silent, rights-bearing individuals with no culture? Moreover, for all this talk about interactions between language and matter (as if they were equal), "language" remains the star of the show, as evidenced in Karin Fierke's claim that "embodied security is ... fundamentally bound up in the interaction between humans and their material environment, both of which are constituted in and through language" (Fierke 2013b, 16). Theoretically, materiality should gain agency through the fact that it cannot ontologically be separated from discursive forces but in practice discourses treat material practices (bodies) as effects (objects) rather than causes (subjects), and consequently maintain agency (Wilcox 2012). A subtle hierarchy is therefore imposed. Reversing the starting point of the inquiry may succeed in troubling dualistic thinking but does not transcend it. We may have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we privileged the effects of cultural constructions of gender difference at the expense of the material effects of bodies, economic justice, and security (see Fraser 2013).¶ There are clearly limits to discursive analysis, especially when it comes to connecting physical insecurity and the materiality of insecurity linked to structures. We must therefore look to the so-called "new materialisms" on posthumanist agency (Connolly 2013), material feminisms (Hughes 2013), and Feminist IPE. Feminist IPE as a diverse body of scholarship studies structures, social practices, and the meanings of the global political economy (Griffin 2010; Peterson 2007). The emphasis falls on specifically gendered bodies while also foregrounding differences that are based upon material and structural inequalities as well as intersectional relations of disadvantage (e.g., gender, institutionalized racism, or ethnicity). In this regard, FPE may find itself closer than FSS to a radical definition of human security as everyday life experiences embedded in global structures of inclusion and exclusion and can keep FSS honest by guiding it back to a concern with everyday (economic) insecurities.¶ While FPE reminds us to consider the global picture of inequality, a systematic feminist political economy theory of security/conflict/violence is yet to emerge. That said, revisiting the material conditions that influence the socioeconomic production of gender as a relation of inequality is a potentially agency-inducing factor that could complement (together with attention to new materialisms) the discursive analytics of FSS, as will be shown in the discussion that follows on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).¶ FSS research has highlighted the harmful discursive misrepresentations that characterize international attention on rape as a tool of war in the DRC (e.g., Baaz and Stern 2013). However, feminist poststructuralism on its own is not a suitable lens to understand the hybridity of how women in the DRC adapt SGBV discourses to fit in with local cultural practices and to fulfil particular sociomaterial needs within their specific context. One needs a postcolonial feminism for that. To keep the international community interested and maintain the status that funding brings, women's organizations in the eastern DRC tend to emphasize the brutal and extensive nature of SGBV. The outcome is not straightforward--women's victimhood is reinforced--but at the same time, it could mean that so-called "victims" fight back, negotiating the "global patriarchal bargain" from below, simultaneously engaging with discourse and the material aspects of socioeconomic justice and empowerment (Jean-Bouchard 2013).¶ This case also underlines the necessity to consider a broad range of materialities (i.e., not only those that are discursively produced, but also "conventional" political economy materialities during and after war). During war, rape as a form of gendered accumulation by dispossession was used in Mozambique and Rwanda to strip women of their productive and reproductive labor power, as well as their possessions and access to land and livestock. Postwar, Baaz and Stern (2013) found that Congolese men rape due to a complex mix of cultural and political economy perceptions about masculinity, women as property, and a sense of entitlement to sex as compensation for their loss of status as providers. Borrowing Claudia Card's (2003) term "social death" to describe the cultural shame as a consequence of rape, I argue that the loss of social vitality is not just a loss of identity and meaning for one's existence, but also a deeply material loss of political, economic, and social relations. Both FSS and Feminist IPE should therefore pay more attention to the political economy of social relations and inequalities of the everyday.

### 2AC - Binary DA

#### The dualistic nature of equating militarism and patriarchy reinforces the cultural basis of Western gendered power relations

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By equating militarism and patriarchy, these feminists often structure their arguments in such a way as to suggest that to be male is synonymous with strength, aggression, and the will to dominate and do violence to others and that to be female is synonymous with weakness, passivity, and the will to nourish and affirm the lives of others. While these may be stereotypical norms that many people live out, such dualistic thinking is dangerous; it is a basic ideological component of the logic that informs and promotes domination in Western society. Even when inverted and employed for a meaningful purpose, like nuclear disarmament, it is nevertheless risky, for it reinforces the cultural basis of sexism and other forms of group oppression. Suggesting as it does that women and men are inherently different in some fixed and absolute way, it implies that women by virtue of our sex have played no crucial role in supporting and upholding imperialism (and the militarism that serves to maintain imperialist rule) or other systems of domination. Often the women who make such assertions are white. Black women are very likely to feel strongly that white women have been quite violent, militaristic in their support and maintenance of racism.

### 1AR – Binary DA

#### The neg oversimplifies feminist ir theory – the strict binary works to recreate the patriarchal hierarchy they seek to destroy

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The question of incentives here certainly applies to some women who were rewarded for their consent. Complying with their gender roles made their evacuations safer and less traumatic. However, in most of the stories in this article, men and women fall along a spectrum between hero and victim, rather than entirely as one or the other. The **protective masculine and vulnerable feminine model represents** a **broad view that** sometimes **abstracts** the **changes** that are taking place on the global level. Patriarchy ought to be seen “not only as an arrangement of political institutions, but also, and perhaps even primarily, as a broadly understood value system that revolves around identity constructs which support and entrench gender-specific hierarchical visions of society” (Bleiker 2000, 32). Looking at the 2006 war from the micro level, I find that the binary relationship that international relations feminists claim in their model of patriarchal violence does not always apply, or applies only in a rigidly logical way. The stories in this study show that women, men and children were all victims of military aggression. However, in some cases, women were the only agents available to save the children; in other cases, representatives of the patriarchal order, such as fathers or fathers-in-law, were either left behind or uninvolved. While the men did protect the womenandchildren in some instances, women, who subscribed to their gender roles as mothers and wives, acted in instances when men were impotent to act, thus in a sense protecting the men also. While **some** would **argue that these** women’s **performances lie outside** the realm of **gender norms**, one could clearly see that such binary distinction is not possible.

### 2AC - Essentialism DA

#### Essentialism DA: Their analysis reductively reifies gender norms.

Reiter 15 (Dan, Department of Political Science, Emory University. 10/2015. “The Positivist Study of Gender and International Relations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 59, no. 7, pp. 1301–1326.)

Summary This wide array of positivist gender/IR work offers three major sets of contributions and challenges to existing IR scholarship. First, this scholarship has provided positivist evidence shedding light on many of the theoretical and descriptive suppositions developed in nonpositivist gender/IR work. Furthermore, the positivist evidence has argued for the substantive as well as statistical significance of gender in explaining critically important phenomena. As noted, Hudson et al. (2012) propose that gender has a larger impact on conflict onset than economic development or democracy. Erik Melander (2005a) found that measures of gender equity have at least as much impact on civil war onset as factors such as economic development, democracy, and ethnic fractionalization. Gizelis (2009) found that improved gender equity, as measured by higher female life expectancy, increases the likelihood of the success of UN peacekeeping missions several fold. **Some of the positivist work critiques the simple view that women are always more peaceful than men are, supporting the general feminist perspective that the effects of gender on behavior are sophisticated**, especially because gender is cultural/social as well as biological. For example, **the role of women in terrorist and insurgent groups varies widely**, as women are sometimes combatants, even engaging in sexual assault. **The effects of gender on public opinion are also complex. Contra some 1980s perspectives about the hypermasculinity of nuclear weapons**, for example, **there is some evidence that American women are not** significantly **less likely** **than American men to favor nuclear weapons use**. Second, this positivist work has helped address some scholarly questions that nonpositivist scholars had identified as important and underexplored. At a very simple level, positivist data collection has helped shed more light on the monumental scope of gender-related violence, a set of behaviors that significantly negatively affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people who happen to be women (Hudson et al. 2012). Positivist work has helped describe and understand the effects of elements of the global economy on the lives of women. It has also helped improve our understanding of the role women play in the foreign policy process, especially female heads of state, cabinet members, and members of parliament. Third, positivist work has helped identify new questions related to gender and IR. Positivist work has explored the role gender plays in the formation of trade policy preferences, the different political roles of female as compared with male casualties, the international determinants of the spread of gender equity, and others. New Directions Positivist scholarship has not yet come close to answering all existing questions relating to gender and IR. Much work remains to be done. Perhaps **the single most important priority is for scholars to be aware of making essentialist assumptions** **that the meaning and behavioral consequences of gender are constant across space and time. Some of the positivist gender/IR work assumes that gender has essentialist effects, using research designs that do not allow for the possibility of varying effects of gender across context. Future positivist gender/IR work would benefit from relaxing essentialist assumptions**, **developing ideas as to how the effects of gender might vary across contexts**. For example, a female national leader emerging from a society with weaker gender equity norms might behave differently than a female national leader emerging from a society with stronger gender equity norms. Research already suggests that the consequences of gender vary drastically across insurgent and terrorist groups, a phenomenon that deserves greater attention.

### 2AC - State Important

#### Feminist strategies must engage the state

Mansbridge 03 (Jane, “Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values @ Harvard, Anti-statism and Difference Feminism in International Social Movements,” International Feminist Journal of Politics)

Feminist strategies that neglect or consistently deplore state action cannot accomplish what women need – because individuals need collectives such as states to solve collective action problems and to move toward more just social arrangements. Strategies that rely heavily on women’s differences from men also cannot accomplish what women need – because women are like men in many ways relevant to individual and collective action. Despite these truths, social movements also need some strategies of action that work separately from and sometimes against the state. Moreover, strategies that accentuate the differences between oppressed and oppressing bring needed energy to a movement. The best overall strategy is, therefore, to realize that both states and difference theories are dangerous weapons, and proceed with caution.¶ In this important paper, Jane Jaquette sounds the alarm. She exposes the dangers of ignoring the state and the dangers of ‘difference feminism’. She also shows how these are linked. Although I will underscore the merits of anti-state activity and difference feminism, I agree that a feminist strategy that neglected or deplored state action would be weak indeed. So would a strategy that relied on women’s differences from men.¶ First, the merits of Jaquette’s argument.¶ One strand in feminist theory and practice greatly suspects the state. This suspicion can escalate into outright rejection, with potentially grave consequences for women.¶ The philosophical case for the state is relatively simple. Collective action¶ can improve human lives. Efficient collective action requires coercion. Instru- ments of collective action involving coercion can, paradoxically, increase human freedom. We are freer to do many things if we can bind ourselves with legally enforceable contracts. Rather than enforcing these contracts privately, it is more efficient and potentially more just to give a monopoly of legitimate violence to one entity, so long as that entity can reasonably claim to be more just than the alternatives. Humans have long struggled to devise relatively legitimate forms of coercion. The history of democracy is part of that struggle, although that history has nowhere produced national-level institutions that are highly legitimate. Despite their incapacity ever to be fully legitimate, however, we still need both states and international institutions to help solve collective action problems and to give scope to the human capacity for justice.¶ Regarding women, the practical case for the state, must be grounded in contemporary realities. In some states, such as Sweden, women do better, compared to men, than in the most egalitarian of known pre-state entities, such as the Kung!. Moreover, although the dangers of state power for women are great, it is not practical to contemplate returning to pre-state entities. Human beings seem to want the goods produced by more extensive forms of cooperation, including those that require legitimate coercion. Given that states will not disappear in the near future, what stance should we take toward them? My answer is: wary usage. State power will be used against women, just as other forms of power are used against women, unless we intervene. One response is to establish barriers, such as constitutional or internationally enforceable rights, to certain kinds of invasions by state power. Another is to make states more likely to act in the interests of women.¶ In the United States both theory and institutional practice carry suspicion of the state farther than in most countries, with some malign consequences. Ours has been a ‘liberalism of fear’ more than an Enlightenment liberalism that envisions a common good. Americans are wary of state power, encouraged in that wariness by powerful capitalist interests. Jaquette rightly warns against this. State power can serve both as a brake on the negative externalities of capitalism and as a positive force for material redistribution. Particularly when patriarchal power takes violent forms in the private sphere, state power can help women struggle against that violence as well as other non-state evils.¶ The question, then, is how far to carry wariness of state power and of theories of state universalism and impartiality. I believe we must both use state power and place bounds on. Because the state as a tool is dangerous and flawed, we need to use it with caution.¶ Jaquette faults contemporary feminist anti-state theorists not for wanting to abolish the state but for spending their energies on wariness rather than on how to use it for redistribution. How important one thinks this problem is depends on how one judges the current balance within feminist theory. Many feminist theorists – e.g. Susan Okin, Nancy Fraser, Iris Young – call for redistributive reforms requiring state power. Perhaps in Latin America, from¶ 356 International Feminist Journal of Politics –––––––––––––––––––––––––––¶ ￼Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014¶ which Jaquette takes her lead, theorists of the North are represented by anti- state theory. In that case, one must ask why these are the theorists Latin American feminists choose to read. Anti-state discourse may have informed radical practice in Latin America not because anti-state theory is dominant in the North but because activists in Latin America find that anti-state discourse meets their organizing needs. Anti-state discourse may reflect the reality of individuals working on the margins of states that either are relatively corrupt or, even more obviously than most, enforce the interests of dominant classes.¶ Jaquette also rightly warns of the dangers of valorizing action in civil society to the neglect of state action. However, we need evidence that the more women participate in NGOs the less they participate in the state. Without such evidence it seems equally plausible that the more women participate in NGOs the more they will acquire the skills and contacts required for involve- ment in state politics. Some individuals also will not be able to deal with the hierarchy, coercion and male dominance embedded in all states. They will need to work in social movements. Political activism usually sustains a division of labor, with the individuals who can best deal with established institutions doing just that and those who are most repelled by those institutions charting another course. The directions they take sometimes conflict with one another.¶ Women and feminists trying to achieve places in the state, whether as femocrats or politicians, face major barriers but also major attractions. I do not know how much we should worry that they will not be attracted to these jobs because of radical anti-state discourse. In the United States this does not seem to be a huge problem. In some countries, women who could be agents of feminist change turn down jobs in the state because those jobs are boring and unsatisfying. When these women speak of their frustrations, radical anti- state discourse appears to play a small or non-existent role.¶ In short, Jaquette is right that an established anti-state discourse within radical movements makes productive interaction with states less likely, but I am not sure that such discourse is created by feminist theory.¶ Jaquette also points to distortions produced by difference feminism. It is true that any stress on women’s differences reinforces the tendency of dominant groups such as white or middle-class women to interpret ‘women’s’ experiences primarily in light of their own experiences. In recent years, women of color have produced the greatest advances in feminist theory, forcing white feminists to look more closely at their hegemonically defined concepts of commonality; this work has given all feminists the tools to understand better differences within their groups and subgroups.¶ In addition, in most areas of presumed personality difference between men and women, the differences are extremely small. The currently definitive meta-analysis of studies on Carol Gilligan’s hypothesis shows that – at least in the United States, in the highly educated populations where she argues that differences should appear – only very small differences can be found.¶ –––––––––––––––––– Jane Mansbridge/Anti-statism and difference feminism 357¶ Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014¶ Most studies do not show women taking a different approach to justice or behaving more cooperatively than men. Studies designed to elicit behavioral gender differences often generate practically none.¶ In-groups, we now know, exaggerate similarities within their group and their differences from other groups. The human brain makes these predictable cognitive and emotional mistakes in in-group/out-group differentiation. Recognizing this tendency, we should constantly struggle to take into account the fact that our social and first-order cognitive estimates of such differences are usually exaggerated. In the case of gender, all societies also engage in ‘gratuitous gendering’ – giving gendered meanings to nouns and patterns of action that do not functionally require that identification. These processes increase even more our perceptions of gender difference.¶ Today we have little idea what differences might or might not emerge between men and women in a non-oppressive society. It seems mistaken, therefore, to insist on difference rather than focusing on the effects of dominance.¶ Finally, as Jaquette warns, promising different political results based on the premise that women are different from men is dangerous. We are almost certain not to deliver on that promise, at least in the short run. The backlash after the US suffrage movement was undoubtedly caused in part by disillusion at the lack of change when women won the vote.¶ And yet, small differences that do appear between men and women can take on major symbolic significance, precisely because of our human tendency to exaggerate group differences. Although using that significance is danger- ous, not only because it exaggerates reality but also because it underlines the very stereotypes that have been used to keep women in their place, the existence of danger does not mean that we should forswear this tool – any more than for swearing the tool of state action. Just remember: when using a dangerous tool, take active precautions against its potential harms.¶ Difference arguments for electing women are not just arguments from ‘utility’, as Jaquette reports Marian Sawer’s point. For example, the fact that women are perceived as more honest than men can advance an attack on corruption by associating its female leaders with honesty. Using positive stereotypes of women in this way need not be degrading. Successful uses may even result in males adopting certain features of female symbolism to signify their own adherence to better standards.¶ In another example, among professional populations in the United States, women are somewhat more likely than men to adopt participatory, egalitarian styles of leadership. The difference probably derives from women’s relative powerlessness, which teaches skills of persuasion rather than command. In the US women’s movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, women used the gender differences they perceived in listening, interpreting body language and participatory style to create significant departures from the prevailing styles of left politics in organizations dominated by men. The message, ‘We do things differently’ is exhilarating. It prompts greater effort in trying to¶ 358 International Feminist Journal of Politics –––––––––––––––––––––––––––¶ Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014¶ forge a new model, because the effort is associated not only with a different culture that can replace the old one but also with a different self and associated selves.¶ Turning from practical politics to political theory, concepts are also often gender-coded. Freedom and self-interest, for example, are often coded as male, community and altruism as female. It is not surprising, then, that when feminist theorists entered the field of theory, some explicitly supported certain values previously denigrated as female. Although the arguments made for these values might not be female, their proponrnts often were. Moreover, having been raised in a subculture that had been allocated cultural respon- sibility for these values, women had often thought about them more thor- oughly than men. Women had also usually experienced the denigration of these values first-hand.¶ In short, Jaquette is right that stressing women’s differences from men is fraught with danger. But values and practices that many cultures associate with women are often good in themselves, denigrated because of their association with women. Asserting the value of these ideals and practices from a stance as women often makes emotional, cognitive and political sense.¶ Importantly, Jaquette identifies a link between anti-state discourse and difference feminism. A number of anti-state theorists who are also strongly anti-essentialist would deny this identification. But in social movements themselves, the identification makes sense. The state is male; hence difference feminists should be anti-state. The state is instrumental, self-interested and hierarchical; women are communal, nurturing and participatory. To the degree that these associations are simply accepted as unchangeable truths, they compound the most problematic anti-state mistake.¶ I agree wholeheartedly with Jaquette’s fears in seeing no visible trend toward a renewed interest in the politics of economic justice, at least in the United States. In contrast to the creativity in the struggle against globalization, there has been an absence of ‘street-level’ activism against, for example, the revolutionary shift in tax burdens in the USA. More positively, the anti- sweatshop movement has had some good effects in raising consumer con- sciousness and bringing younger activists in touch with international labor movement organizing. As for the causes of the shift away from the politics of economic justice, I agree with Jaquette that it is related to the post-Cold War era and the temporary triumph of capitalism. I am not so sure that it has much to do either with activists’ anti-state discourse or with difference feminism.¶ This commentary has concentrated on the caveats to Jaquette’s thesis. I conclude by stressing again my fundamental agreement with her argument. Feminists have a ‘stake in a capable state’. It would be catastrophic to be so carried away by the theoretical virtues of civil society or by anti-state discourse as to deaden oneself to the practical need to work with the state to improve the lives of women.¶ Because ideas have influence, it is worth stressing Jaquette’s point that¶ –––––––––––––––––– Jane Mansbridge/Anti-statism and difference feminism 359¶ Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014¶ ‘norms adopted internationally depend on states to implement them’; and only states can change the rules for women and other disadvantaged groups. The welfare state is a huge improvement over the arbitrary power of men in private families. Women’s groups must therefore work closely with govern- ments or remain on the fringe. Feminists will not only have to ‘learn to live with the state’. They should learn to work with the state. For those who do not already know this, Jaquette’s article is required reading.

### AT: Empiricism/Rationality Bad

#### Empiricism is good and compatible with a feminist framework

Neilson, 05 (Joyce, Sociology Prof @ University of Colorado at Boulder, Vital Variables and Gender Equity in Academe: Confessions from a Feminist Empiricist Project, Signs 31(1), pp. 1-28)

The now substantial literature on the topic describes feminist research as “passionate, scrappy, energizing” (Garko 1999, 167) and also as contradictory, controversial, revolutionary, dynamic, problematic, oxymoronic, explosive, and filled with creative tension. Deborah L. Tolman and Laura A. Szalacha refer to “epistemological unrest” (1999, 10). Michelle Fine and Susan Gordon describe feminist psychology as an inherent contradiction, pointing out that psychological laboratory studies, with their isolation, sterility, and lack of relationships, are designed to “drive women mad” (1992, 11). Elizabeth Merrick (1999) describes her complex feminist reanalysis of data on teen pregnancy as “like chewing gravel.” There is agreement in the literature that traditional methods need feminist-inspired interruption (Harding 1987). Indeed, Ellen Scott and Bindi Shah (1993, 99) cite Beatriz Pesquera as wondering if “we can develop empowering methodologies without examining the whole process of academic production within the university.” Certainly we have accomplished one goal of this article, that is, to capture the contradictory, emergent, and potentially revolutionary nature of feminist research as it is practiced. Backstage, inside-story accounts of research in progress have been contributing to improving methodologies at least since Julius A. Roth’s “Hired Hands Research” (1966). Feminist research is especially known for its reflectivity. It is not surprising, then, that there is a substantial literature of case studies of feminist research projects.16 Indeed, there is so much that Jane Ussher (1999) asks if feminist researchers are obsessed with methods. A second purpose of this article is to contribute to this literature. Our focus is specifically on feminist empiricism, something described in the literature as in transition and controversial even (or primarily) among feminists. See, for example, Sandra Harding’s (1993) detailed comparison between the feminist standpoint, on the one hand, and prefeminist and spontaneous feminist empiricist epistemologies, on the other; Richmond Campbell’s (1994) model of internal feminist empiricism; Helen Longino’s (1993) philosophical model of contextual empiricism; and Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s (1990, 1993) naturalized empiricism. Thus, juxtaposing our reflective thoughts on feminist empirical work with writings by theorists and philosophers on the topic should be informative. Not surprisingly, we do not exactly fit any one description of feminist empiricism—not completely and not yet anyway. Certainly we recognize what Harding (1993) calls spontaneous feminist empiricism in the earliest stages of this project. But our thinking quickly became unstable, transitioning across different feminist approaches.17 To contribute to current discussion and debate around feminist empiricism, how it is practiced, and how it is transitioning, we present a few close-to-the-ground conclusions based on this particular research experience. As stated earlier, we recognized, perhaps agonizingly, that our feminist thinking had outpaced available methods and strategies. This was most obvious in efforts to measure feminist consciousness when we realized that it was impossible to capture conceptual complexities and refinements in a few or even a series of survey questions. We also realized that to generate useful data and capture the thinking of our respondents, we had to abandon our own constructs and temporarily adopt our respondents’ points of view. We saw the same pattern—that our feminist thinking had outpaced our empiricist approach—with respect to understanding salary differences between male and female faculty. We began with an effort to explain (away) via regression analyses the gendered gap in salaries at this university. We ended with critical questions about the larger social structure and culture—questions that are unanswerable within regression-mode thinking. The questions that emerge when one attempts a deeper—behind the numbers—understanding of this pattern relate to the division of labor by sex. That is, answers to questions about salary differences are found in patterns of sex segregation by academic discipline and likely by associated patterns of work distribution (research, teaching, and service) across and within disciplines. These in turn are patterns that reflect the larger societal division of labor by sex. It is interesting that these kinds of substantive questions begin to approach those that constitute starting points for feminist standpoint theory. We cite, for example, Harding’s description of Dorothy Smith’s questions about women’s work that are generated by a strategy of grounding knowledge in women’s everyday experience: “She [Smith] points out that if we start thinking from women’s lives, we (anyone) can see that women are assigned the work that men do not want to do for themselves” (Harding 1993, 53). We come to a similar conclusion—that our feminist work developed similarities to standpoint and postmodern approaches—from our experience of dual vision. That is, as we shifted between views of the university from central and from marginal social locations, from both the inside and the underside, we experienced firsthand the multivocal and complex nature of the realities we were studying. In other words, this process erased, eroded, and undermined any semblance of the monologic voice that usually underlies and characterizes prefeminist empiricism and much of feminist empiricism. Does it matter what we call our practice of feminist research? Does it matter whether what we have described is contextual (Longino 1993), spontaneous (Harding 1993), positivist, internal (Campbell 1994), or naturalized feminist empiricism (Nelson 1990, 1993)? It does insofar as feminist empiricism is still emerging and this work can be seen as part of the transition toward delineating an effective, successful, and transforming version of feminist research. As a feminist project whose researchers are cognizant of the variety of feminist alternatives, it has descriptive and thus epistemological value. As an actual project against which primarily theoretical work can be compared, its value is in its very doing. Why confessions? This account feels confessional in the sense that alternatives to feminist empiricism—standpoint and postmodern feminism—seem more cutting edge because they are more deliberately critical of traditional ways of producing knowledge. We felt apologetic for continually falling back on known empiricist strategies when we were thinking more radically and aware of being constrained methodologically. This is an odd stance to take, though, since feminist empiricism has been revolutionary in its contribution to women’s liberation, and, as Francesca Cancian (1996) and Longino (1993) point out, despite much writing about creating innovative methods, most feminist work revises mainstream methodologies. (An oft-repeated theme in the literature is that feminism is not in the methods per se but in their use.) Postmodern thinking in particular is often more exhilarating and challenging theoretically, yet insofar as it rejects grand theory, large-scale models, and indeed any kind of generalization, it poses almost irresolvable empirical challenges. Our theme that feminist empiricism is outgrowing its traditional methods is worth pursuing through further analysis of specific research projects such as the one we describe. For now, we continue to stretch and expand the research paradigm with which we began.

### At: Sjoberg

#### They overstate gender and their root-cause arguments re-create essentialism – this directly indicts Sjoberg

Prugl 14 (Elisabeth, professor of International Relations/ Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, March, http://www.cambridge.org.secure.sci-hub.bz/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/div-classtitlea-discussion-of-laura-sjobergandaposs-span-classitalicgendering-global-conflict-toward-a-feminist-theory-of-warspandiv/16E6B6EA6CCAB1DACFC1B1A4D9F26837)

One of the dangers of unmooring feminism from itself and from other critical approaches is that its insights become molded so as to be all things to all approaches. In the process, its core propositions get flattened so they can adjust to other theoretical axioms. This is the case here with regard to gender, arguably feminism ’ s core analytical concept. Sjoberg develops a “ realist feminism, ” proposing that gender hierarchy is a structural feature of the international system and a permissive cause of war, in addition to or substituting for anarchy (p. 98). In this approach, gender becomes “ genders ” (pp. 76 ff), that is, the categories women and men, and gender hierarchy an organizational attribute of states. What is lost is gender as a relational concept and as an analytical category, the usages preferred by many feminists. Casting aside feminist debates about the sense and nonsense of structuralist theories of patriarchy, Sjoberg resurrects them under the mantle of gendering neorealism. In her dialogue between unequals, gender yields to the theoretical axioms of the mainstream.

Another casualty of this dialogue between unequals is the explanatory status of masculinity, which has become somewhat contested in feminist IR. In Sjoberg’s hands, hegemonic masculinity freezes into a predictive variable. She hypothesizes that “ the more competitive a state ’ s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war. . . . States with elements of hypermasculinity in the nationalist discourse would be expected to be more aggressive ” (p. 100). We are left to guess why masculinities always seem to be (more or less) competitive, what hypermasculinity consists of, and how its characteristics can be known in advance. Despite the feminist truism that gender (and thus masculinity) is a social construct, pro- fessed also by Sjoberg, she seems to imply that too much masculinity somehow brings about war. That is, masculinities always seem to be already tainted with militarism and aggression, suggesting some masculine core that no amount of social construction can overcome. Perhaps it is overdrawn to assign responsibility for this confusion to a dialogue between unequals in which gender is reformu- lated to fi t positivist epistemologies; however, a targeted engagement with feminist literatures on militarist masculinities might have prevented this mistake. Indeed, Gendering Global Con fl ict i s most satisfying when the author leaves the mainstream behind, as she does in the next to last chapter, on gendered experiences of war. Here, she brings to life one of the most important con- tributions of feminist writings on war, that is, recalling what war feels like to those who participate in it, its economics, its deprivations, its sensual impressions, and its violences. This is the starting point I would love to have seen Sjoberg take in this book, using her encyclopedic knowledge of the fi eld, together with her analytic prowess, not just to argue but to demonstrate the unique contri- butions of feminist security studies.